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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Several years ago, the Berks County Prison instituted a 
"fee-for-service" policy under which it began charging 
inmates a small fee when they sought health care. Under 
this policy, indigent inmates are guaranteed care, but their 
prison accounts are debited for the relevant charges. In this 
appeal, we consider constitutional challenges to this policy. 
 
I. 
 
A. The following facts are uncontested or were found by 
the district court. See Reynolds v. Wagner, 936 F. Supp. 
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1216, 1219-23 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The Berks County Prison 
houses both pre-trial detainees and sentenced prisoners. Of 
the institution's average daily population of approximately 
775, between 100 and 120 are federal inmates housed 
under contract with the federal government. The remaining 
550 inmates are held under state law. Approximately 35% 
of the inmate population is Hispanic, and approximately 
10% of the population speaks only Spanish. 
 
The Berks County Prison styles itself as a "new 
generation prison" based on the philosophy of providing 
inmates with more choices in their daily lives so that they 
can learn to act more responsibly. In accordance with this 
approach, the prison, in 1993, adopted a program under 
which the inmates held under state law are generally 
charged small fees when they seek health care. The 
purpose of the fee program is not to generate revenue but 
to "instill inmate responsibility and discourage abuse of 
sick call." Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. at 1219. 
 
Under the program, inmates are charged a $3 fee for a 
medical evaluation by a nurse. (This is referred to as "sick 
call.") If a nurse refers an inmate to the doctor after the 
initial sick call, there is no charge to see the doctor. 
However, if the inmate chooses to see the doctor without a 
referral, there is a $5 charge. If the doctor decides that the 
inmate should have been referred at the initial screening, 
the $5 charge is waived. Inmates are not charged for follow- 
up visits ordered by a doctor or nurse and are not charged 
for legitimate return visits for a condition for which they 
have already been treated. Inmates are not charged for 
prescription medicine, and over-the-counter medication is 
issued by the medical department if deemed necessary for 
an inmate's treatment. Over-the-counter medication is also 
available for purchase from the commissary. 
 
The Inmate Handbook sets forth certain exceptions to the 
fee requirement. Initial commitment screenings, psychiatric 
services, and emergency services1 are free. Similarly, there 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Some accidents qualify as emergencies, but some do not. For example, 
the Inmate Handbook explains that while a cut requiring stitches is an 
emergency and does not require a fee, a twisted ankle from activities in 
the recreation yard is not an emergency. In addition, treatment required 
as a result of activity in violation of prison policy results in a fee. 
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is no fee for the treatment of chronic illnesses, including 
such treatment as changes of dressings, colostomy 
changes, and treatment for conditions such as diabetes, 
hypertension, or AIDS related syndrome. The determination 
of whether a condition at sick call is a chronic illness or 
emergency is made by a member of the nursing staff. The 
assessment of an inmate's condition is made independently 
and regardless of his financial status. 
 
Whenever medical service is provided, an inmate is 
required to sign a "Medical Service Fee Form." Id. at 1220. 
If the inmate refuses to sign the form, a member of the 
medical staff initials the form, and the fee is deducted from 
the inmate's account. No inmate is ever refused treatment 
because he lacks funds in his account, but the account of 
an inmate who lacks funds is nevertheless debited, and a 
negative balance is thus created. 
 
If an inmate's account has a negative balance, 50% of his 
incoming funds are used to satisfy the negative account, 
and the the remainder can be used for personal purchases. 
This 50% deduction continues until the negative balance is 
eliminated. At discharge, any available funds are credited 
towards the inmate's negative balance and the remainder, 
if any, is paid to the inmate. Negative balances that remain 
on an inmate's account after discharge are maintained on 
the inmate's permanent record. If the inmate is 
recommitted, the negative balance is imposed again. In 
addition, if an inmate departs the prison with a negative 
balance, a collection agency may be employed to collect the 
debt. 
 
The nurse who makes the initial assessment of an 
inmate's condition informs the prisoner about the channels 
through which a fee assessment can be challenged. An 
inmate who disagrees with a fee assessment mustfirst file 
an "inmate communication form," which is reviewed by the 
medical department. Id. at 1221. An inmate who receives 
an unfavorable response to his inmate communication may 
submit a grievance to a prison committee2  consisting of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Inmate Handbook states that "a grievance may not be filed simply 
because you disagree with a staff member's decision or instructions, 
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warden, the assistant warden, the deputy warden for 
treatment services, the deputy warden for custody services, 
and the director of administrative services. Grievances are 
decided by a majority vote of the committee whose 
decisions may be appealed to the Berks County Prison 
Board. 
 
Details on the workings of the program are contained in 
the Inmate Handbook. Copies of the Inmate Handbook are 
provided in each housing unit, in the library, and in every 
department of the prison. During orientation, a prison 
officer and a counselor review the contents of the Inmate 
Handbook with the inmates and answer questions. 
Although there is no copy of the Inmate Handbook in 
Spanish, Spanish-speaking officers and counselors explain 
the Handbook to all Spanish-speaking inmates during 
orientation. Moreover, the medical department employs "at 
least three nurses" who are fluent in Spanish. Id. at 1222. 
 
B. In November 1994, individual inmates filed this 
action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, challenging the 
constitutionality of the program. The original complaint was 
subsequently amended, and the case was certified as a 
class action in February 1995. Named as defendants were 
the Berks County Prison and its warden.3  
 
In August 1995, the district court issued an order 
bifurcating trial on the issues of liability and damages. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
unless it meets the above criteria." Id. at 1221. Included in the "above 
criteria" are grievances that concern alleged violations of jail policy. 
The 
warden of the Berks County Prison testified that grievances about fee 
assessments fall into the category of complaints about violations of jail 
policy and are thus proper. The district court credited the warden's 
testimony that medical fee charges could be challenged by means of 
grievances even though the wardens' testimony arguably conflicted with 
the testimony of a deputy warden. There was also the testimony of two 
inmates that they were aware that medical fee assessments could be 
contested in this way. 
 
3. The district court certified a class "consisting of all indigent 
persons 
who have been, are, or will be subjected to the challenged medical 
services fee policy." Reynolds v. Wagner, 936 F. Supp. 1216, 1218 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996). 
 
                                5 
 
 
 
May 1996, the court held a one-day trial on the issue of 
liability. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court 
rejected the inmates' constitutional claims. See Reynolds v. 
Wagner, supra. This appeal followed. 
 
C. On appeal, the inmates challenge three of the district 
court's holdings: (i) that the fee-for-service policy did not 
constitute deliberate indifference to the inmates' serious 
medical needs and therefore did not violate their Eighth 
Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment rights; (ii) that the 
fee-for-service program did not result in the taking of 
inmate property without due process; and (iii) that the 
program did not impermissibly infringe on the inmates' 
First Amendment right of access to the courts. 
 
The Supreme Court has rejected strict scrutiny as the 
appropriate standard of review for the constitutionality of 
prison regulations. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); see 
also Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro , 834 
F.2d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1987). Instead, the question is 
whether the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate 
penological interest. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d at 332. In 
determining the reasonableness of a challenged regulation, 
we consider: 
 
       (1) the rational relationship between the regulation 
       and the governmental interest put forward to justify it; 
 
       (2) the existence of alternative means to exercise the 
       asserted right; 
        (3) the impact on prison resources of accommodating 
       the asserted right; and 
 
       (4) the existence of "ready alternatives" to 
       accommodate the asserted right at "de minimis" cost to 
       valid penological interests. 
 
Id. (citation and footnote omitted). 
 
The inmates' central claim concerns the validity of 
regulations relating to the prison's provision of health care. 
The specific standard applicable to an Eighth Amendment 
claim concerning the denial of health care to inmates is the 
two-pronged standard enunciated in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 104 (1976). This standard requires a showing (1) 
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that the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the 
inmates' medical needs and (2) that those needs were 
serious. Id. We apply the Estelle standard in the context of 
the level of scrutiny set out by Turner. 
 
II. 
 
DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE 
 
A. The inmates make two separate sets of arguments as 
to why the Berks County Prison program constitutes 
"deliberate indifference" to their "serious medical needs." 
First, they contend that charging inmates for health care is 
per se unconstitutional because the Constitution bars a 
state from conditioning inmates' access to health care on 
their "ability or willingness to pay." (Appellants' Br. at 13). 
Second, the inmates maintain that even if a fee-for-service 
program is not per se unconstitutional, the Berks County 
Prison program is unconstitutional "as implemented." 
 
B. Before addressing the merits of these arguments, 
however, we must consider the defendants' contention that 
the inmates lack standing because they "have 
demonstrated no actual harm." (Appellees' Br. at 23). The 
defendants contend that the inmates "offered no evidence to 
support a finding that serious medical conditions were 
untreated or even that treatment was delayed because of 
the medical fee policy." Id. 
 
In making this argument, the defendants rely on Lewis v. 
Casey, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (1996), in which the Supreme 
Court held that because a class of inmates had not shown 
widespread actual injury, the class could not challenge 
certain features of a state correctional system that allegedly 
infringed upon the class's right of access to the courts. The 
Court explained: 
 
       It is the role of courts to provide relief to claimants, in 
       individual or class actions, who have suffered, or will 
       imminently suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of 
       courts, but that of the political branches, to shape the 
       institutions of government in such fashion as to 
       comply with the laws and the Constitution . . . . 
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       [T]he distinction between the two roles would be 
       obliterated if, to invoke intervention of the courts, no 
       actual or imminent harm were needed, but merely the 
       status of being subject to a governmental institution 
       that was not organized or managed properly. 
 
116 S. Ct. at 2179. Then, in an example on which the 
defendants in this case rely, the Court stated: 
 
       If . . . a healthy inmate who had suffered no 
       deprivation of medical treatment were able to claim 
       violation of his constitutional right to medical care, see 
       Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 50 L. Ed 2d 251, 
       97 S. Ct. 285 (1976), simply on the ground that the 
       prison medical facilities were inadequate, the essential 
       distinction between judge and executive would have 
       disappeared: it would have become a function of the 
       courts to assure adequate medical care in prison. 
 
Id. 
 
The inmates counter that this statement in Lewis  is 
dictum and that the Court's prior holding in Helling v. 
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993), controls. In Helling, an 
inmate brought a S 1983 action against prison officials, 
alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment Rights due to 
exposure to environmental tobacco smoke. Id. The inmates 
argue that the Helling Court specifically held that an Eighth 
Amendment claim may be based on prison conditions that 
pose an unreasonable risk to a prisoner's future health. Id. 
at 33-34. Helling explained: 
 
       We have great difficulty agreeing that prison authorities 
       may not be deliberately indifferent to an inmate's 
       current health problems but may ignore a condition of 
       confinement that is sure or very likely to cause serious 
       illness and needless suffering the next week or month 
       or year. 
 
Id. at 33. 
 
While we do not view the statement in Lewis as 
necessarily inconsistent with Helling, we need not attempt 
to reconcile these precedents because the inmates' claims 
clearly fail on the merits. See Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 
524, 530-31 (1976) (where merits can be resolved in favor 
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of party challenging jurisdiction, resolution of complex 
jurisdictional issue may be avoided). 
 
C. The "Per Se" Challenge.  The inmates assert that the 
prison, in charging them a modest fee for health care, is 
violating the Eighth Amendment's bar on "cruel and 
unusual punishment." The Eighth Amendment applies to 
sentenced prisoners, but the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment operates to provide similar 
protection for pre-trial detainees. See Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 
833 F.2d 468, 472 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[T]he Due Process rights 
of a pre-trial detainee are at least as great as the Eighth 
Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.") 
(quotation omitted); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 
(2d Cir. 1973) ("[I]t would be absurd to hold that a pre-trial 
detainee has less constitutional protection against acts of 
prison guards than one who has been convicted."). 
 
The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment requires the provision of basic medical care. 
See Helling, 509 U.S. at 32; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
103-04 (1976). There is, of course, no general constitutional 
right to free health care. In prisons, however, since inmates 
are deprived of the ability to seek health care on their own, 
the state is obligated to provide basic health care. As the 
Supreme Court explained in DeShaney v. Winnebago 
County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989): 
 
       [W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and 
       holds him there against his will, the Constitution 
       imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some 
       responsibility for his safety and general well being. . . . 
       The rationale for this is simple enough: when the State 
       by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an 
       individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care 
       for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his 
       basic human needs -- e.g., food, clothing, shelter, 
       medical care, and reasonable safety -- it transgresses 
       the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth 
       Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 
 
Id. at 199-200. 
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In order to establish an Eighth Amendment (and 
Fourteenth Amendment) violation a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that there was a " `deliberate indifference [on 
the part of the State] to serious medical needs of 
prisoners.' " Helling, 509 U.S. at 32 (quoting Estelle, 429 
U.S. at 104). Such conduct would constitute an 
"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to 
contemporary standards of decency." Helling, 509 U.S. at 
32; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
 
Although the Supreme Court has held that a state must 
provide inmates with basic medical care, the Court has not 
tackled the question whether that care must be provided 
free of charge. Cf. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. 
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 245 n.7 (1983) ("Nothing we say here 
affects any right a hospital or government entity may have 
to recover from a detainee the cost of medical services 
provided to him."). The district court here held that there is 
nothing unconstitutional about a program that "require[s] 
that inmates with adequate resources pay a small portion 
of their medical care." Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. at 1224. We 
agree. We reject the plaintiffs' argument that charging 
inmates for medical care is per se unconstitutional. If a 
prisoner is able to pay for medical care, requiring such 
payment is not "deliberate indifference to serious medical 
needs." Helling, 509 U.S. at 32. Instead, such a 
requirement simply represents an insistence that the 
prisoner bear a personal expense that he or she can meet 
and would be required to meet in the outside world. See, 
e.g., Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Commissioners, 
766 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1985) (nothing per se 
unconstitutional about charging an inmate $3 for every 
medical visit; such a charge, by itself, did not constitute 
deliberate indifference under Estelle); Mourning v. 
Correctional Medical, 300 N.J. Super. 213, 226 (1997); 
Words v. Graves, 1997 WL 298458, *3 (D. Kan. May 28, 
1997); Gardner v. Wilson, 959 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (C.D. 
Cal. 1997); Hutchinson v. Belt, 957 F. Supp. 97, 100 (W. D. 
La. 1996); Robinson v. Fauver, 932 F. Supp. 639 (D.N.J. 
1996); Bihms v. Klevenhagen, 928 F. Supp. 717, 718 (S.D. 
Tex. 1996); Hudgins v. Debruyn, 922 F. Supp. 144 (S.D. 
Ind. 1996); Johnson v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Serv., 
885 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Md. 1995). 
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Contrary to the inmates' suggestion, we see nothing in 
our prior decision in Monmouth County Corr. Institution 
Inmates v. Lanzaro, supra, that casts doubt on the 
constitutionality of the program challenged here. In 
Lanzaro, our court wrote that prison officials may not 
"condition provision of needed medical services on [an] 
inmate's ability or willingness to pay." 834 F.2d at 347. The 
program at issue does not "condition the provision of 
needed medical services on an inmate's ability to pay." 
Under the program, no inmate is ever denied medical care 
for lack of money. Nor does the program condition the 
provision of medical care on an inmate's "willingness" to 
pay in the sense that we understand the Lanzaro court to 
have used that term. In making the statement in question, 
Lanzaro cited Ancata v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 
F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985). There, the prison officials 
knew that the inmate (Ancata) was seriously ill and needed 
to see a specialist, but despite Ancata's complaints, the 
prison officials refused to send him to one unless he agreed 
to bear the costs of the evaluation. Id. at 702. Ancata could 
not fulfill their condition because he was indigent. Id. As it 
turned out, Ancata had leukemia, and he died soon after 
from respiratory failure. Id. It is thus apparent that the 
statement in Lanzaro refers to the withholding of essential 
medical treatment from an inmate who refuses to agree to 
pay because of indigency. Nothing of this sort can happen 
under the Berks County Prison program at issue here. 
 
The inmates' argument also finds no support in the 
statement in Lanzaro that a case of deliberate indifference 
is made out " `if necessary medical treatment is delayed for 
non-medical reasons.' " 834 F.2d at 346 (quoting Ancata, 
769 F.2d at 704). Under the Berks County Prison program, 
the prison officials do not delay the provision of medical 
care to any inmate who seeks such care. The program 
instead simply assesses a modest fee under some 
circumstances. If any delay occurs, it is solely because of 
decisions made by the inmates themselves, not because of 
any conduct on the part of the prison administration. 
 
The plaintiffs in this case ask us to stretch the bar on 
"cruel and unusual punishment" to a program that simply 
attempts to provide inmates with a modest disincentive to 
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abuse sick call. Although the Supreme Court stated in Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), that the Eighth 
Amendment "must draw its meaning from evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society," plaintiffs have not demonstrated that a prison's 
fee-based program violates such standards. On the 
contrary, fee-for-service programs are very common outside 
prisons. 
 
Although it is possible that the fee-based program at 
issue here may cause some prisoners to refrain from 
seeking medical treatment as early as they might otherwise 
do so, the deliberate indifference standard of Estelle does 
not guarantee prisoners the right to be entirely free from 
the cost considerations that figure in the medical-care 
decisions made by most non-prisoners in our society. The 
Supreme Court explained in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 
(1987): 
 
       [W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' 
       constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is 
       reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. 
       In our view, such a standard is necessary if prison 
       administrators, and not the courts, are to make the 
       difficult judgments concerning institutional operations. 
 
Id. at 89 (quotations and citations omitted); see also Lewis, 
116 S. Ct. at 2185. Here, the fee-for-service plan was 
adopted to teach prisoners financial responsibility and to 
deter the abuse of sick call. Both of these goals fall well 
within the ambit of "legitimate penological interests." See 
James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627, 630 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Here 
the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program would appear 
to be reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest 
in encouraging inmates to rehabilitate themselves by 
developing a sense of financial responsibility."). 
 
D. The "As Implemented" Challenge. The inmates next 
argue that even if it is not per se unconstitutional to charge 
prisoners for medical care, the Berks County program is 
unconstitutional as implemented because it creates a 
substantial barrier to health care, i.e., one that meets the 
deliberate indifference standard of Estelle. The inmates 
point to eight separate features of the Berks County 
program as problematic: 
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       [1.] the burden of a fee system on a poor, non-mobile 
       population, which has been scientifically demonstrated 
       to have negative and potentially dangerous health 
       consequences, particularly by causing poor persons to 
       defer medical care until medical conditions grow 
       especially serious; 
 
       [2.] the imposition of fees higher than thos e assessed 
       in the statewide Medicaid program for indigent 
       persons, thereby imposing a substantial barrier to 
       health care; 
 
       [3.] the failure to provide a written Spanis h-language 
       version of the fee-for-service policy; 
 
       [4.] the failure to properly define the te rms "chronic 
       illness" and "emergency," which causes inmates to 
       forego medical attention because they cannot 
       determine what services are covered; 
 
       [5.] the failure to properly define the te rms "chronic 
       illness" and "emergency," which causes inmates to be 
       arbitrarily deprived of health care because of the lack 
       of uniform standards; 
 
       [6.] the failure to offer free medical treat ment for 
       emergencies (even life-threatening ones) when the 
       injury came about as a result of an inmate violating 
       prison rules and regulations, which deprives inmates of 
       medical care in the most serious of conditions and 
       causes inmates to forego seeking such attention; 
 
       [7.] the exclusion of "contagious diseases" from the 
       categories of fee-exempt medical services; and 
 
       [8.] the creation of "negative balances" for inmate 
       accounts and announcing the intention of seeking to 
       collect such debts after an inmate is discharged from 
       prison, which actively discourages inmates from 
       seeking medical attention in circumstances where the 
       inmates suffer serious medical conditions. 
 
(Appellants' Br. at 13-14). 
 
As with their "per se" challenge, the district court found 
the inmates' "as implemented" challenge wanting, and 
rejected it. Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. at 1226. We agree. 
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For convenience, we will consolidate the inmates' eight 
complaints into four: (i) that the fee-for-service program 
charges higher fees than the statewide Medicaid program 
(complaint # 2); (ii) that the program's terms are not 
adequately communicated to the inmates, and that this 
causes the inmates to forego care because they do not 
understand when a fee will be assessed (complaints ## 3, 
4 & 5); (iii) that program causes inmates unduly to delay in 
seeking necessary medical care (complaints ## 1, 6 & 8); 
and (iv) that charging fees for the treatment of contagious 
diseases causes an unneeded increase in the risk that such 
illnesses will spread in the inmate population (complaint 
# 7). 
 
(i) Higher Fees than Medicaid.  The inmates present us 
with no more than a general assertion that the fee-for- 
service program charges "higher" fees than the statewide 
Medicaid program. (Appellants' Br. at 20). They point to no 
evidence regarding the magnitude of the difference. 4 More 
fundamentally, we see no basis for concluding that the fees 
charged under Medicaid represent the maximum that may 
constitutionally be charged against a prisoner's account. 
See Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. at 1225. We therefore reject the 
inmates' argument. 
 
(ii) Inadequate Communication.  The inmates' complaint 
# 3 is that the prison authorities have failed "to provide a 
written Spanish-language version of the . . . policy." 
(Appellants' Br. at 14). The district court rejected the claim 
that this deprived Spanish-speaking inmates of access to 
care. The court explained that, although there was no 
written Spanish version of the policy, 
 
       Spanish speaking correctional officers and counselors 
       . . . explain the Handbook, which contains a thorough 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In addition, in the fact section of their brief, the inmates state that 
"Pennsylvania's Medicaid fee schedule sets fees for doctors' and nurses' 
visits at amounts substantially lower than those set by Berks County 
Prison. Pa. Code S 1101.63(b)." (Appellants' Br. at 7). Once again, 
however, this assertion is too vague and conclusory to support the 
inmates' claim. Cf. Commonwealth of Pa. v. HHS, 101 F.3d 939, 945 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (arguments mentioned in passing, but not squarely argued, 
are deemed waived). 
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       description of the medical fee program, to all Spanish 
       speaking inmates during orientation. Finding of Fact 
       30. In addition, there is always a Spanish speaking 
       employee on duty, twenty-four hours a day and the 
       medical department employs at least three nurses who 
       are fluent in Spanish. Finding of Fact 30. 
 
Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. at 1225. In light of these facts, we 
agree with the district court that the lack of a Spanish 
translation of the policy does not constitute deliberate 
indifference. However, we also join the district court in 
urging the prison authorities to provide such a translation.5 
 
In complaints ## 4 and 5, the inmates assert that the 
failure of the prison to define the terms "chronic illness" 
and "emergency," causes inmates to "forego medical 
attention" and to be "arbitrarily deprived of health care." 
(Appellants' Br. at 14). (As previously noted, no fee is 
assessed when treatment is sought for "chronic illness" or 
in case of "emergency"). Although the Inmate Handbook 
does not provide a definition of either term, it lists examples 
of chronic illnesses (dressing changes, colostomy changes, 
and treatment for conditions such as diabetes, 
hypertension, or AIDS related syndrome) and emergencies 
(a cut requiring stitches). Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. at 1225. 
In addition, the handbook provides examples of non- 
emergencies (a twisted ankle from activities in the 
recreation yard and treatment required as a result of 
activity in violation of prison policy). Id. 
 
We agree with the district court that "[t]hese explanations 
of the above exempted services do not cause the fee 
program to run afoul of the deliberate indifference 
standard." Id. at 1226. The terms "chronic illness" and 
"emergency" are not obscure. Moreover, the district court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As noted, the Berks County Prison has a population that is 
approximately 35% Hispanic, and 10% of the total population speaks no 
English. Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. at 1219. The district court thus wrote: 
 
       [W]e . . . encourage Prison Officials to make available a copy of 
the 
       Inmate Handbook in the Spanish translation. This should mitigate 
       any lingering difficulties stemming from the language barrier. 
 
Id. at 1225. We endorse this suggestion. 
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found as a fact that "[i]nmates know or should know that 
they will never be denied medical care because of an 
inability to pay." In other words, the inmates know that 
they will never be denied care even if they do not have 
enough money and the condition for which treatment is 
sought does not fit into one of the fee-exempt categories. 
 
(iii) Delays in Seeking Treatment.  Complaints ## 1, 6, 
and 8 boil down to a single assertion: that the fee-for 
service program causes inmates to delay unduly in seeking 
care. The theoretical argument is that the charges that the 
program imposes ($3 for a visit to the nurse and $5 for a 
visit to the doctor) lead near-indigent prisoners to delay and 
even forego care for serious medical conditions, rather than 
using up their scarce funds. We reject this argument for 
two reasons. 
 
First, the inmates did not provide evidence supporting 
this claim. There is almost no evidence that inmates have 
in fact delayed in seeking important treatment because of 
the fee-for-service program. Indeed, the inmates' expert, Dr. 
Robert L. Cohen, acknowledged that he had not seen any 
harm resulting to the inmates as a result of the program. 
(App. Vol. I, p. 87). Dr. Cohen did testify that he believed, 
based on studies of the effects of co-payment plans on non- 
prison, indigent and near-indigent populations, that the 
Berks County plan would deter inmates from seeking 
treatment when they optimally should. (App. Vol. I, pp. 25, 
31 & 36; noting that there is almost no published data on 
the effects of co-payment plans on prison inmates). But Dr. 
Cohen's testimony was far too vague and removed from the 
context at hand for the district court to have found that the 
Berks County program in fact has the widespread effect of 
deterring inmates from seeking necessary health care. 
 
Second, even if the modest fees assessed under the Berks 
County Prison program did deter some prisoners from 
seeking medical care at the optimal time, we do not believe 
that such a deterrent effect amounts to cruel and unusual 
punishment or that it violates the due process rights of 
pretrial detainees. Putting aside for the moment the 
inmates' asserted need for the money in their prison 
account to pay for certain litigation expenses, the inmates 
have not pointed out evidence showing that they need this 
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money for any vital expenses. Inmates generally use their 
prison funds to purchase items at the commissary, but the 
most important items that inmates might otherwise 
purchase at the commissary are provided free of charge to 
indigent inmates. These items include "toilet articles, soap, 
shampoo, toothpaste, [a] toothbrush[,] .. . writing paper, 
[postage paid] envelopes, pens, [and] pencils." (App. Vol. 
IV., p. 1031). 
 
The testimony of several inmates was illustrative. Inmate 
Richard Reynolds, testified that he did not seek medical 
treatment because his account balance was low, he needed 
legal materials, and his hygienic needs cost him $20 per 
week. (App. Vol. II, p. 402). Yet he testified that he 
purchased a newspaper at $3.35 per week (id. at 417); he 
subscribed to Easy Rider magazine and Hot Rod magazine 
for $39.95 and $14.95 respectively (id. at 420); he made out 
money orders to various payees in the amounts of $100 or 
$200, as well as one to his father for a car payment (id. at 
439); received $20 every two weeks from his father; and he 
made purchases of snacks and candy in the amounts of 
$30, $20, and $20 (id. at 441-42). Reynolds further testified 
that he delayed seeking medical treatment when he had a 
cold and as a result his condition got worse (id. at 403). 
Ultimately, Reynolds was seen by the medical department 
75 times and was charged a total of $14, a small amount 
in comparison to his other expenses. (Id. at 433). 
 
It is apparent that the Berks County Prison Program does 
not force inmates to choose between necessary medical care 
and other essentials. Rather, it forces them to choose 
between, on the one hand, the payment of a small fee for 
certain types of non-emergency medical care and, on the 
other hand, the use of these funds for non-essential 
expenses. Putting inmates to this choice does not violate 
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
(iv) Fees for Treatment of Contagious Diseases.  In 
complaint # 7, the inmates argue that the exclusion of 
contagious diseases from the categories of fee-exempt 
medical services constitutes deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs. Of their eight complaints, the 
inmates give this one the least attention. Their argument on 
this issue in their main brief consists of the single 
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statement: "Expert testimony established the clear danger 
of this exclusion [i.e., the contagious disease exclusion]." As 
a threshold matter, an argument consisting of no more 
than a conclusory assertion such as the one made here 
(without even a citation to the record) will be deemed 
waived. See Commonwealth of Pa. v. HHS, 101 F.3d 939, 
945 (3d Cir. 1996) (arguments mentioned in passing, but 
not squarely argued, will be deemed waived); see also 
Southwestern Pa. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121 F.3d 
106, 122 (3d Cir. 1997) ("appellate courts generally should 
not address legal issues that the parties have not developed 
through proper briefing."). 
 
In addition, not only is the inmates' theoretical argument 
made inadequately, but the argument suffers from a lack of 
supporting evidence. As best we can tell, the theoretical 
argument underlying the contagious disease claim has to 
do with externalities. The argument is that if inmates with 
contagious diseases delay seeking treatment, the result is 
that other inmates will be exposed to the risk of contagion 
for a greater amount of time than they would be otherwise, 
i.e., there is an external effect in addition to the internal 
effect. Cf. Richard J. Zeckhauser, Coverage for Catastrophic 
Illness, 21 Pub. Pol'y 149, 164, 159-70 (1973) (describing 
the positive externalities of health care attributable to a 
reduction of contagion). 
 
Because of the modest nature of the fees and the absence 
of evidence that inmates need the funds in their prison 
accounts for essential expenses, we do not think that an 
inmate could assert a valid Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment claim on the ground that the Berks County 
Prison program harmed him by causing him to delay 
seeking medical care for a contagious disease. Under the 
circumstances, any delay and resulting harm could be 
attributable to his own unjustified decision. 
 
On the other hand, in such a case, the effect of a single 
inmate's choosing to delay treatment is suffered not only by 
that inmate, but also by everyone else -- they all suffer an 
increased risk of contracting the contagious disease. It is 
conceivable that an inmate might be able to assert a valid 
Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim if he could show 
that a prison fee program caused other inmates to delay 
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seeking treatment to such an extent as to cause a serious 
risk of an epidemic, that prison officials knew of this 
serious risk, but that they exhibited deliberate indifference 
to it and thus failed to take proper precautions. Cf. Hutto v. 
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978) (noting that among the 
prison conditions for which the Eighth Amendment 
required a remedy was placement of inmates in punitive 
isolation under conditions where infectious diseases could 
spread easily); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 
1974) (inmates were entitled to relief under the Eighth 
Amendment where they proved threats to personal safety 
from exposed electrical wiring, deficient firefighting 
measures and the mingling of inmates with serious 
contagious diseases). In this case, however, the inmates' 
evidence did not begin to show what would be required to 
make out such a claim.6 
 
III. 
 
Due Process Challenges 
 
In addition to the deliberate indifference due process 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In his testimony, Dr. Cohen merely made the general statement that 
infectious diseases develop commonly in prisons and spread quickly 
because of high population density. (App. Vol. I, p. 46). Although Dr. 
Cohen's general statement is not enough to support the inmates' Eighth 
Amendment claim, we do share his concern about the prison's blanket 
policy of charging fees for treatment for all contagious diseases. With 
diseases such as tuberculosis, the impact of delays in inmates' seeking 
treatment may cause serious health hazards. Cf. Commerce Justice State 
Appropriations: Hearings on National Institute of Justice Study on the 
Health Needs of Soon-to-be Released Inmates Before the House 
Subcommittee on Appropriations (statement of Edward A. Harrison, 
President, National Commission on Correctional Health Care) 1997 WL 
10571095 ("tuberculosis . . . is 500% more common in urban jails than 
in the general population . . .; Hepatitis B virus, HIV and AIDS are all 
widespread in the correctional environment"); Kim Marie Thorburn, 
Health Care in Correctional Facilities, 163 Western J. Med. 50 (1995), 
1995 WL 12613424 at *11-12 ("As the New York and California prison 
system outbreaks show, overcrowded institutions, often with a high 
proportion of immunosuppressed people, are fertile ground for the 
spread of tuberculosis."). 
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claims made with respect to the pre-trial detainees, 
plaintiffs contend that the challenged policy violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause by "taking 
inmate funds from inmate accounts without due process of 
law." (Appellants' Br. at 26). The inmates argue that the 
district court erred in rejecting both their procedural and 
substantive due process challenges. 
 
A. Procedural Due Process.  Inmates have a property 
interest in funds held in prison accounts. E.g. , Mahers v. 
Halford, 76 F.3d 951, 954 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 
S. Ct. 696 (1997); Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 222 
(7th Cir. 1986); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th 
Cir. 1985). Thus, inmates are entitled to due process with 
respect to any deprivation of this money. Mahers, 76 F.3d 
at 954. The inmates argue that, in deducting fees for 
medical services from their inmate accounts, the Berks 
County Prison program provides: (i) inadequate notice; (ii) 
inadequate authorization procedures; and (iii) inadequate 
post-deprivation process for challenging erroneous fee 
assessments. (Appellants' Br. at 28). 
 
The procedural protections required by the Due Process 
Clause are determined with reference to the particular 
rights and interests at stake in a case. Washington v. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990). The factors to be 
considered are the private interests at stake, the 
governmental interests, and the value of procedural 
requirements in that particular context. Id. (citing Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
 
(i) Notice.  The inmates argue that Berks County 
program provides deficient notice to the Hispanic 
population of the prison because there is no written 
Spanish translation of the fee-for-service program. 
(Appellants' Br. at 29). This argument is essentially the 
same as one of the arguments made by the inmates as part 
of their submission that the program "as implemented" 
results in constitutionally impermissible conditions of 
confinement. See supra at 12-13. Once again, we find the 
argument unpersuasive. 
 
The amount of notice due depends on the context. Gilbert 
v. Homar, 117 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (1997) ("Due Process is 
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flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands"). As noted, in assessing 
claims of due process violations, we look not only at the 
private interests at stake, but also at those of the 
government entity. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union 
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). 
 
The inmates claim inadequate notice because 10% of the 
inmate population can read only Spanish and there is no 
Spanish translation of the program description. As 
previously noted, however, the district court found that 
Spanish-speaking officers explain the policy to all the 
Spanish-speaking inmates and that there is always a 
Spanish-speaking officer on duty. Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. 
at 1222. In addition, the court found that the prison 
medical department employed at least three nurses who 
were fluent in Spanish. Id. 
 
We agree with the district court that a Spanish 
translation of the Inmate Handbook would be useful. 
However, we discern no basis for holding that the failure to 
provide Spanish-speaking inmates with a written 
explanation of a prison policy, when the policy is orally 
explained by Spanish-speaking correctional officers, creates 
a constitutional violation. The constitutional issue is 
whether the inmates are provided adequate notice so as to 
be able to challenge any improper deprivation, not whether 
they are provided written notice. Cf. Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 
2182 (courts are to defer to prison officials to determine 
how best to ensure that inmates with language programs 
have adequate information and assistance). 
 
(ii) Authorization.  With respect to authorization 
procedures, the inmates explain that "[a]uthorization to 
withdraw money from an inmate account occurs when an 
inmate is asked to sign a Berks County Medical Service 
Form when the assessment is made." (Appellants' Br. at 29- 
30). The inmates' complaint, made in cursory fashion, is 
that the medical fee "assessment occurs regardless of 
whether the inmate signs the form." (Id.) 
 
We have already held that charging inmates for medical 
fees is not unconstitutional per se. See supra at 10. 
Permitting a prison to charge fees to further legitimate 
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penological interests would be meaningless unless the 
prison implemented procedures to make the system work 
effectively. The inmates' argument appears to be that fees 
should not be deducted from their accounts without their 
own express authorization. But delaying treatment while 
prison officials haggled with an inmate about signing a form 
authorizing the assessment of a fee could lead to 
frustrating and hazardous Eighth Amendment problems. 
See Ancata, 769 F.2d at 704. Cf. Taylor v. Bowers, 966 
F.2d 417, 423 (8th Cir. 1992) (doctor's delay of surgical 
intervention in order to prompt inmate to confess he 
swallowed a drug-filled balloon violated inmate's right to 
treatment of serious medical condition). And if there had to 
be a threshold hearing on the validity of a fee, that delay 
might exacerbate an inmate's already serious medical 
condition. Cf. Washington, 494 U.S. at 225 (holding a 
prison regulation with respect to the involuntary 
administration of anti-psychotic drugs without a prior 
hearing valid where the regulation was an accommodation 
between the inmate's liberty interests and the State's 
interest in providing appropriate medical treatment to 
reduce the danger that the inmate presented to both 
himself and others). Further, delays in treating a 
contagious disease could expose other inmates and prison 
officers to increased health risks. Hence, in order to have a 
fee system work practicably and at the same time provide 
medical services in a manner that does not constitute 
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a prison 
must have the ability to deduct fees from an inmate's 
account even when the inmate refuses to grant 
authorization. See Campbell, 787 F.2d at 224 (the 
practicality of needing to collect funds in the prison context 
is an important factor in determining whether the relevant 
procedures satisfy due process requirements). Put 
differently, our point is that if inmates know that they can 
refuse to pay, still receive treatment, and in the meantime 
spend their funds on other things, then it is likely that at 
least some prisoners will simply refuse to authorize 
deductions. Such refusals would undermine the ability of 
the prison to administer its fee-for-service program 
effectively. 
 
In addition, we note that the deduction here is afixed, 
non-punitive assessment and that these features limit the 
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 danger of the prison authorities' abusing the power to make 
unauthorized deductions. See Quick, 754 F.2d at 1523 
(suggesting that when the deduction of money is non- 
punitive, less process is due). Moreover, this is not a 
situation in which the inmates are deprived of the benefits 
of their property and receive nothing in return; rather in 
exchange for the fees, the inmates receive the benefit of 
health care, the value of which undoubtedly exceeds the 
modest fee assessed. See Mahers, 76 F.3d at 954-55 (need 
for procedural due process safeguards is somewhat reduced 
where the deduction of money from inmates' accounts goes 
substantially to benefit the inmates' interests). 
 
(iii) Hearing.  The inmates next argue that the 
"procedural aspects of the fee program fail to provide a 
meaningful way to challenge an alleged improper 
assessment." (Appellants' Br. at 31). As a basis for their 
claim, the inmates point to the Inmate Handbook. The 
Handbook states that an inmate who contests a fee 
assessment can file an Inmate Communication Form that 
will be reviewed by the Medical Department. (Appellants' 
Br. at 30). The crux of the inmates' claim concerns the 
filing of a grievance after initially contesting a fee. The 
inmates tell us that "an independent review beyond the 
Medical Department of a challenged assessment is 
essential." The inmates argue that this essential second 
level of independent review is missing. Specifically, the 
inmates point out that although the Inmate Handbook 
allows for a grievance to be filed when an Inmate is not 
satisfied with the results of his initial challenge, the 
Handbook states that "[a] grievance may not be filed simply 
because [one] disagree[s] with a staff member's decision." 
(Appellants' Br. at 31). The argument appears to be that 
this limited right to appeal to an independent body is 
constitutionally inadequate. 
 
Even assuming that it is necessary for the inmates to 
have a right to appeal to an entity independent of that 
which issued the initial denial, i.e., the Medical 
Department, see McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 459 (3d 
Cir. 1995) ("due process requires an impartial decision 
maker before final deprivation of a property interest"), cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1017 (1996), the inmates' claim faces a 
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barrier it cannot surmount, viz., the district court's finding 
that the rule that "a grievance may not be filed simply 
because one disagrees with a staff member's decision" does 
not apply to grievances about improper assessments under 
the fee-for-service program. Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. at 
1228. The court found that such grievances may be filed 
because they fall under an exception allowed for "report[s] 
[of] alleged violations of jail policy." In view of this factual 
finding, the inmates' challenge can succeed only if they can 
show that the district court committed clear error. 
 
"A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only if the court has 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed." Coalition to Save Our Children v. Bd. of 
Education, 90 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation and 
internal quotation omitted). Deference to the factfinder is 
especially appropriate with respect to credibility 
determinations, since it is the fact finder, and not the court 
of appeals, that has the opportunity to hear and observe 
the witnesses first hand. In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 85 
F.3d 105, 116 (3d Cir. 1996) (district court's credibility 
assessments are "deserving of the highest degree of 
appellate deference"). Here, the testimony of the warden of 
the Berks County Prison directly supports the district 
court's finding. The inmates, however, point to what they 
say is contradictory testimony from the deputy warden. 
(Appellants' Br. at 31). The inmates' complaint boils down 
to a challenge to the district court's credibility 
determination. We do not see an adequate basis to reverse 
that determination. 
 
In sum, we hold that the inmates have not demonstrated 
error in the district court's rejection of their procedural due 
process challenges.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The inmates also point to Pennsylvania statutes regulating the "taking 
by any agency of individual property rights." (Appellants' Br. at 32). The 
inmates argue that Pennsylvania's heightened procedural protections are 
not only entitled to deference, but also create a liberty interest that is 
entitled to protection. The district court's failure to acknowledge the 
Pennsylvania statutes and court decisions, the inmates say, was error. 
We disagree for two reasons. 
 
First, even if Pennsylvania's heightened procedural protections were 
entitled to some deference, the deference is by no means conclusive -- 
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B. Substantive Due Process.  The inmates claim that the 
Berks County Prison program violates substantive due 
process because it is too vague. Relying on Horn v. Burns 
and Roe, 536 F.2d 251, 254 (8th Cir. 1976), the inmates 
observe that "a noncriminal statute is unconstitutionally 
vague under the due process clause of the Fifth or 
Fourteenth amendments when its language does not convey 
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct 
when measured by common understanding or practice." 
See also, e.g., Trojan Technologies, Inc. v. Com. of Pa., 916 
F.2d 903, 914 (3d Cir. 1990). The inmates contend that the 
program at issue here fails to meet this standard. 
 
Plaintiffs' assertions, which mirror some of the 
arguments made with respect to their unconstitutional- 
conditions-of-confinement claim, are (a) that exceptions to 
the fee assessment policy, such as for chronic illnesses and 
emergencies, are not specifically defined and (b) that the 
Inmate Handbook's statement that "[a] grievance may not 
be filed simply because you disagree with a staff member's 
decision" gives inmates the impression that they are not 
entitled to seek an independent review of a challenged 
medical fee assessment. We agree with the inmates that the 
current description of the fee-for-service policy is not a 
model of clarity. However, in order to show that the policy 
violates due process it is not enough for the inmates to 
demonstrate that more specific language could have been 
used. Instead, the policy must be so vague as to amount to 
the absence of any real policy or statute. Horn, 536 F.2d at 
254. 
 
We agree with the district court that the fee-for-service 
program at Berks County does not violate this standard. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
as the inmates appear to suggest it should be -- in determining the 
degree of procedural protection required under federal constitutional 
standards. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit case that the inmates cite for the 
proposition that deference is due was one where the majority upheld the 
prison policy despite the fact that it was contrary to both state 
legislative 
policy and case law. See Mahers, 76 F.3d at 957 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
Second, with respect to the alleged creation of a liberty interest, a 
state's 
choice to provide heightened procedural protections does not create an 
independent liberty interest. See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 709 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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First, the terms "chronic illness" and "emergency" are 
relatively clear in themselves, and their meaning is 
illustrated with examples. Second, with respect to the right 
to file grievances, there was testimony at trial that inmates 
are informed twice of their right to grieve a fee assessment, 
once at orientation and once again at the time when a fee 
is assessed. (App. Vol. I, pp. 155-60; Vol. IV, pp. 1084-86). 
In addition, the warden testified that inmatesfile grievances 
pertaining to medical fees "all the time." (App. Vol. I, p. 
157). Hence, the fee-for-service program, is not 
unconstitutionally vague. 
 
The inmates tell us that they "introduced a wealth of 
information that shows that serious mistakes go 
uncorrected [in the assessment of fees]." (Appellants' Br. at 
37). The "wealth of information," however, apparently 
consists of testimony from four inmates that errors were 
made in assessing fees against them. We agree with the 
district court that this evidence is of negligible value in view 
of the scope of the entire program. 
 
IV. 
 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
The inmates' final claim is that the district court erred in 
rejecting their claim that the program abridged their First 
Amendment right of meaningful access to the courts. See 
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 
(1983). The inmates argue that charging them fees for 
medical services puts them to the impermissible choice of 
paying for legal expenses or paying for needed health care. 
See Gluth v. Kanga, 951 F.2d 1504, 1508 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that putting inmates in the situation of having to 
choose between purchasing hygienic supplies or purchasing 
essential legal supplies was "unacceptable" under the 
Constitution's guarantee of meaningful access to the 
courts). In support of this argument, the inmates point to 
the fact that they are charged for photocopying and for 
mailing materials to the court.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The charge for photocopying appears to apply whether an inmate is 
indigent or not. With respect to mailing legal materials, however, 
indigent inmates are entitled to have all their legal material mailed by 
the prison, except that a negative balance is applied to their accounts. 
Reynolds, 936 F. Supp. at 1230. 
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In Section II, we analyzed the inmates' claim that 
charging them fees for medical services constituted 
deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs 
because it deterred them from seeking health care as 
promptly as they would in the absence of a fee. See supra 
at 14-17. The threshold issue in analyzing that claim was 
whether the claim was barred under Lewis v. Casey, 116 S. 
Ct. at 2179, because of a failure to show actual or 
imminent harm, i.e., the actual injury that would have 
provided standing to sue. We noted that Lewis arguably did 
not control because (a) Lewis was a First Amendment right- 
of-access to-the-courts case and (b) a prior Supreme Court 
case, Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993), squarely 
held, in the context of an Eighth Amendment deliberate 
indifference claim, that inmates could bring a claim based 
on an assertion that existing conditions of confinement 
created a serious health hazard and put them at an 
increased risk in the near future. We found it unnecessary 
to decide this question because the inmates' claims clearly 
failed on the merits. Here, however, the inmates' claim is a 
First Amendment access-to-the-courts claim that falls 
squarely within the ambit of Lewis. 
 
Lewis involved a class action brought by adult prison 
inmates in Arizona, alleging that the prisons were depriving 
the inmates of their rights of access to the courts and 
counsel in violation of the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 116 S. Ct. at 2177. In particular, the inmates 
alleged inadequacies in their access to law libraries and 
legal assistance. Id. at 2179. Among the shortcomings in 
the facilities identified by the district court were 
inadequacies in the training of library staff, the updating of 
legal materials, and the availability of photocopying 
services. Id. at 2178. In rejecting the inmates' claims and 
reversing the district court's grant of an injunction in favor 
of the inmates, the Supreme Court explained that the 
Constitution gave the inmates no free-standing rights to a 
law library or legal assistance. Id. at 2179-80. The relevant 
right was the right of access to the courts. Id. at 2180. 
Legal assistance, photocopying services, and law libraries 
were merely means to achieving access to the courts. Id. 
Because there was no free-standing right to a law library or 
photocopying services, an inmate could not demonstrate 
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the necessary actual or imminent injury simply by 
establishing that those services were inadequate. Id. 
Instead, to be able to bring a viable claim, the plaintiff- 
inmates had to show direct injury to their access to the 
courts. Id. The Court explained that an inmate could show, 
for example, that "a complaint he prepared was dismissed 
for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which, 
because of deficiencies in the prison's legal assistance 
facilities, he could not have known." Id. "Or [he could show] 
that he had suffered arguably actionable harm that he 
wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by 
the inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even 
to file a complaint." Id. 
 
The inmates' claim here suffers from the precise 
deficiencies identified by Lewis. The inmates argue that 
their access to the courts has been stymied as a result of 
having to pay for medical services and thereby having less 
money to pay for legal mail and photocopying. However, 
there is no First Amendment right to subsidized mail or 
photocopying. Under Lewis, the inmates must point to 
evidence of actual or imminent inference with access to the 
courts -- for example, evidence that an inmate was not able 
to file his complaint in time because he could not afford the 
cost of postage or that an inmate was not able to file legal 
papers because he could not photocopy certain documents. 
Since the inmates have utterly failed to point to any 
evidence of such direct injury to their right of access to 
their courts, their First Amendment challenge fails. 
 
V. 
 
For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is 
AFFIRMED. 
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